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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to consider the phenomena of love-melancholy through an object
relations framework, conceiving of this phenomena as a revolt against mourning. The theoretical
framework utilized is the early object relations concepts introduced by Freud in his 1917 paper
Mourning and Melancholia and elaborated by object relations theorist Melanie Klein in her later
works. Using the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004) as a case example, this
writer identifies a developmental process that occurs in resolving the pain of love-melancholy,
emphasizing mourning the lost love object as necessary for establishing hope for future
attachments.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
How heavy the days are.
There's not a fire that can warm me,
Not a sun to laugh with me,
Everything bare,
Everything cold and merciless,
And even the beloved, clear
Stars look desolately down,
Since I learned in my heart that
Love can die.
- Hermann Hesse, 1911
Imagine the following scenario. A complete stranger approaches you with a confession.
She states: “my heart is broken.” Maybe this stranger’s lover has abandoned her. She may be
grieving the death of a family member. Perhaps she has lost all of her belongings in a house fire,
received a cancer diagnosis, or was denied custody of her children. Even without any context for
the events leading up to this stranger’s current feeling state, it is likely that you would be able to
identify the distinct blend of sadness, disappointment, hopelessness, and pain imbued within the
rather abstract concept of a broken heart. The common narrative element linking the
aforementioned possible scenarios is that something, or someone, has been lost. Heartbreak is
perhaps the most universally understood articulation of the complicated set of emotions that arise
following a painful loss. While loss is an inevitable reality of human existence, as evidenced by
the falling of autumn leaves or by death itself, there is no evident consensus (not among
laypersons nor experts) of the path one must take to resolve pain and distress resulting from the
loss of romantic love.
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My personal fascination with romantic heartbreak was initially sparked while I was
engulfed by it my self. Although the sadness I felt during this time is unforgettable, what I recall
even more vividly is the raw and intense quality of my emotions. I look back on this first
heartbreak as a transformative awakening of my truest, deepest self. I was simultaneously
terrified and fascinated, miserable and thrilled. Although a number of years have passed, I
regularly think about this experience and am faced with new questions and realizations. One
element of heartbreak, evident in my own experience as well as commonly expressed in songs
and poems, remains especially confusing. What keeps the heartbroken person in the throes of
distress? I was able to uncover the beginnings of an answer to this question while listening to a
pop song, Bonnie Raitt’s (1991) I Can’t Make You Love Me:
“Here in the dark, in these final hours, I will lay down my heart and I'll feel the
power. But you won't. No, you won't. ‘Cause I can't make you love me if you
don't. I'll close my eyes, and then I won't see the love you don't feel when you're
holding me. Morning will come and I'll do what's right; just give me till then to
give up this fight. And I will give up this fight”
While the protagonist is painfully aware that her feelings of love are unreturned, she begs
to remain in the embrace of her uncaring lover at least until the morning comes, at which time
she will relinquish the relational struggle. The implication is that although she may be able to
free herself from the immediacy of this pain as soon as tomorrow, she actually desires to hold on
to the feeling for another night. This signaled me to the understanding that there is something
alluring about the refusal to let go of one’s attachment to a lost object, even when it is evident
that love is unrequited or the romantic attachment has otherwise been severed.
Despite the significant occurrence of intrapsychic distress resulting from romantic love
and heartbreak, there is little research devoted to its etiology and best practices for treatment.
Tallis (2004) states: “as a culture, we are happy to recognize an association between love and
mental illness, only provided that it isn’t taken too seriously. Perhaps this is why the link is most
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frequently expounded, not in medical textbooks, but in popular songs.“ (p.258) Due to
intersecting social and historical factors, our modern view is that romantic distress is
significantly mysterious, vexing, and torment-laden when compared to other forms of loss. This
air of mystery informs cultural narratives of love relationships, as well as contributes to clinical
implications for the social work field regarding the treatment of individuals who are suffering
from pain and distress arising from romantic love attachments.
The aim of this paper is to consider the phenomena of love-melancholy through an object
relations theoretical frame, in order to identify intrapsychic processes that may be operational in
resolving the distress associated with this phenomena. The theories utilized are the early object
relations concepts introduced by Freud in his 1917 paper Mourning and Melancholia and
expanded upon by object relations theorist Melanie Klein in her later works. Using the film
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004) as a case example, this writer identifies a
developmental process that occurs in resolving the pain of love-melancholy, emphasizing
mourning the lost love object as necessary for establishing hope for future attachments. The
following chapter will outline the conceptual and methodological frameworks employed within
this paper.
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CHAPTER II
Conceptualization and Methodology
This paper begins with the proposition that distress arising from the experience of
romantic heartbreak is a significant area of clinical concern. Through a review of the relevant
literature, I found that an analysis focused on the experience of romantic heartbreak resulting
from relationship dissolution was not sufficient in encompassing the breadth of scenarios in
which this distress may arise. To put this dilemma plainly, it was important for me to find a term
that spoke to the pain and distress associated with romantic love in general rather than limiting
the analysis to pain that arises during heartbreak. This led me to seek alternative terminology that
would speak to the reality that distress may be activated both within love and in heartbreak.
Within my research, I encountered the (now antiquated) concept of love-melancholy which
Wells (2007) identifies as being rooted in both early medical and literary representations of
distress arising from romantic love. Modern sufferers of what was previously understood as
love-melancholy may now identify this feeling state with terms such as: heartbroken, lovesick,
lovelorn, or madly in love. Love-melancholy, although not often utilized in our modern
vernacular, fully encompasses the feeling state that I had previously struggled to name. This
exploration of love-melancholy as clinical phenomena generally seeks to address following
questions: what is it about both romantic love and romantic heartbreak that feels painful? And,
how is this pain ultimately resolved? In order to address these questions, I first look to Freud’s
(1917) theory of mourning and melancholia in which he postulates a series of intrapsychic
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processes that occur following the loss of a love object. This leads me to the work of Melanie
Klein, object relations theorist, who elaborates on the concepts introduced by Freud.
Theoretical Framework
I came to utilize Freud’s (1917) Mourning and Melancholia as the initial theoretical
framework when I noticed striking similarities between Freud’s articulation of symptoms arising
within melancholia and symptoms associated with romantic heartbreak. Importantly, Freud
conceives of mourning and melancholia as almost identical processes yet articulates that while
melancholia is generally regarded as pathological, mourning is regarded as healthy and normal.
In order to more fully grasp the significance of mourning the loss of a love object, I looked to
Freud’s (1915) work On Transience in which Freud explores the factors that contribute to a
resistance against entering the mourning process. My analysis of these works led me to conceive
of the distress associated with love-melancholy as due, at least in part, to a resistance against
mourning.
Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917) provided a springboard for the exploration of
Melanie Klein’s object relations theories. Object relations theory positions relationships as
central to intrapsychic development and functioning, and is thus useful in understanding distress
associated with love-melancholy. The Kleinian concepts that are central to this analysis are the
significance of internal / external objects, introjection, projection, ambivalence, splitting, the
developmental paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, reparation and guilt. Following the
identification and exploration of these theoretical concepts, I employ an object relations analysis
to an example of love-melancholy within the discussion section.
Plan of Analysis
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I’ve elected to use the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind as the mechanism of
analysis. The content and plot of this film offers the potential to identify each of the theoretical
elements as they exist for the characters both practically, as well as in within their internal
worlds. The fantasy world of the film allows us to access the subconscious journey of these
characters, and thus becomes a useful case study that I can analyze clinically. I am able to
analyze this complex “case” in a deeply psychodynamic manner (and within the timeframe
necessary) without actually being relationally connected as a therapist. It is important to note
here the work of Carel (2007) who engaged in an analysis of the same film, using Freudian and
Kleinian theories and concepts. While Carel’s (2007) work affirmed my choice in selecting this
film as a basis for analysis (as it utilizes the same theories), I found it to be focused mostly on
larger thematic elements present in the plot and thus did not specifically reference this work
within the deeper exploration of the film as a case study.
Perspective and Background
It is important to state that I am a person that identifies as having experienced lovemelancholy in varying degrees, as referenced in the introduction. Most profoundly was within
the context of a transformative heartbreak that occurred five years ago and was eventually
resolved. Importantly, I identify as having personally experienced many of the intrapsychic
processes that are discussed in this paper, particularly the move from part to whole object
relations through mourning and the resulting increased security in internal object relations. I
have described ultimately coming away from this painful heartbreak experience as feeling more
whole, with a more securely attached and rooted understanding of my self and all of my past and
present attachments. This heartbreak serves as a major point of origin of my intellectual
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curiosity regarding the topic of this paper, and thus influenced the set of questions that I entered
this inquiry with. These questions are:
‐
‐
‐
‐

Why do heartbreak and romantic love in general, both include pleasurable feelings
alongside feelings of distress and immense pain?
Is there a benefit to feeling the pain of heartbreak?
What contributes to the subject’s experience of heartbreak as a transformative life event?
Is there a process that one must go through to resolve the pain of heartbreak / lovemelancholy?

Limitations
The methodological limitations of this inquiry begins with the reality that much of the
relevant literature reflects the ideology that distress arising from romantic love is confusing,
mysterious, and perhaps too abstract a concept to subject to analysis. Furthermore, much of the
relevant literature does not account for ways in which race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, ability,
religion, or location factor into an individual’s experience of distress associated with romantic
love. In order to resist against the presumption that these intrapsychic processes are universal, I
chose to end the paper with a section outlining how the identified theories may be utilized within
the clinical setting rather than suggesting specific interventions.

7

CHAPTER III
Love-Melancholy: The Dark Pleasure
Straightway, a delicate fire runs in
my limbs; my eyes
are blinded and my ears
thunder.
Sweat pours out: a trembling hunts
me down. I grow
paler than grass and lack little
of dying.
(Excerpt from Sappho’s Poem of Jealousy trans.
William Carlos Williams, 1958)

When represented in song and poem, romantic love has readily been expressed as a form
of physical and mental illness (Tallis, 2004). Ancient Greeks referred to love as theia mania,
which translates in English as “madness from the gods”. The poetry of Sappho provides some of
the most compelling evidence of this affliction. In Poem of Jealousy, Sappho observes the object
of her affection in conversation with another suitor and becomes immediately overwhelmed with
physical ailments arising from her jealous despair (Sappho, trans. 1958). Wells (2007) describes
how love-melancholy was constructed in early medicine as a disease of both the mind and body,
in which the subject’s fixation on a beloved object results in an internal turmoil accompanied by
external symptoms such as “weeping, sobbing, sighing, pallor, and agitation” (p. 2). While lovemelancholy can be understood as a pathological condition, the concept of disease or sickness is
often implied within the realm of all romantic love (Wells, 2007). The move from “normal” love
to pathologized love creates the impression that within the scope of romantic love, there is a
potential disorder lying in wait. “Normal” love and love-melancholy can thus be understand as
markers on a spectrum of behavior, as Wells (2007) states, “encompassing wholly “normal”
8

experience and extreme, delusional behavior.” (p. 3) The phenomena of love-melancholy is
represented in both early medical literature (as well as poem and song) as a dark, overwhelming
force that disrupts the subject’s ability to access reason while producing physical ailments and
emotional distress.
To focus entirely on the distress of love-melancholy would be a simplistic representation
of the phenomena. Wells (2007) identifies atra voluptus, or “dark pleasure” as a central
operational element within this affliction. While the subject may be tormented by the experience
of love-melancholy, she also experiences some degree of pleasure within the fixation.
According to Wells’ (2007) this paradoxical pleasure and pain can be understood as “a willfully
indulged erotic suffering that holds the beloved prisoner by stripping her of any reality outside of
her lover’s obsessive mind.” The concept of the beloved object as contained within the psyche
of the love-melancholic subject is a significant component of the phenomena, and informs the
theoretical analysis. The fixation of the love-melancholic sufferer on the beloved object leads to
a psychic containment or devouring, which according to Wells’ (2007) can be understood as a
“heavily disguised resistance to mourning the lost (or inaccessible) beloved.” (p. 12)
Love-melancholy, while a somewhat antiquated term, provides a point of origin for
understanding the intrapsychic processes that occur within the distress arising from romantic
love or heartbreak. This chapter will define and describe love-melancholy, explore the
influential historical and social factors connected to this clinical phenomenon, and provide a
review of the relevant empirical research as well as identify gaps in this research in order to lay
the ground for theoretical analysis.
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Love-Melancholy in Early Humoral Medicine
The first mention of lovesickness in a medical text occurs in first century CE by Aretaeus
the Cappadocian, where it is described as a depressive illness featuring the same symptoms as
melancholia: depression, fear, eating disorders, insomnia, irritability, restlessness (AltbauerRudnik, p. 87, 2012). Whereas melancholia was thought to have no particular etiology, it was
believed that lovesickness was caused by separation from the loved one.
Until the eighteenth century all disease was understood through the framework of
humoural theory. The central idea of humoural theory was that the body was made up of four
humours (black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm) and that illness resulted from an imbalance
between them. A Renaissance-era medical text describes the process of lovesickness, as
"excessive mental action, due to constant meditation on the love object, dried and cooled the
body, causing the dominance of black melancholy bile and deepening the person's despair and
physical suffering" (Altbauer-Rudnik, p.88, 2012). The word melancholia is actually derived
from humoural concepts, melaina chole meaning excessive black bile. Beginning in the early
eighteenth century, love was cited as a potential cause for madness (specifically melancholia and
mania) in a number of texts. When the humoural model was eventually rejected during the
eighteenth century (due to major discoveries regarding blood circulation), the diagnosis of love
melancholy began to fade away, as its symptomatology and etymological origin were reliant on
humoural theory. Mania, not as specifically tied to humoural theory, began to receive increased
clinical focus. In the early nineteenth century, French physician Jean-Etienne-Dominique
Esquirol described his patient’s distress regarding love as “erotomania” (Altbauer-Rudnik, p. 91,
2012). Esquirol described erotomania as a delusional disorder in which the patient is convinced
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of a fantasy that the object of her desire loves her in return. Presently, the DSM V diagnosis of
Delusional Disorder (297.1) includes an erotomanic subtype.
It is important to note that changing social attitudes towards romantic love, in addition to
the evolution of medicine, also greatly influenced these diagnostic shifts. In sixteenthseventeenth century England, medical ailments associated with separation from the love object
(i.e. love melancholy) were frequently cited within critiques of the arranged marriages of the
Elizabethan era and used to promote the significance of love between husband and wife, a
distinctly Puritan value (Altbauer-Rudnik, p.89, 2012). Although the modern feeling state of
romantic love and heartbreak may not have shifted too drastically since the classical age (as
evidenced by the poems of Sappho), scientific and social factors greatly influence the way in
which these feelings are understood over time. Hopefully, this historical context illustrates the
varied ways in which physical and mental health concerns related to romantic love / heartbreak
may be socially constructed, and should always be understood as dependent on the norms and
values of the culture and time in which they are being considered.
Tennov’s Limerence
In the mid-1960’s Dr. Dorothy Tennov, a psychology professor, began research on the
topic of romantic love. Tennov’s research was initially inspired by a conversation with a female
student who disclosed immense distress after being rejected by a romantic partner. Tennov
(1979) describes this student’s story as a moment of awakening, stating “what amazed me was
that I suddenly realized that probably all around me, among colleagues and friends as well as
students, was a form of suffering that is usually hidden” (p. 4). Tennov describes scouring
psychological texts and psychoanalytic writings on the topic of love to see how the hidden pain
had been brought to light. Tennov discovered that most of the research and writings on love
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failed to capture the quality expressed by her student (and known to Tennov herself), stating:
“the general view seemed to be that romantic love is mysterious, mystical, even sacred, and not
capable, apparently of being subjected to the cool gaze of scientific inquiry” (p. 5). Tennov went
on to conduct interviews with over 500 individuals about their experiences of romantic love,
encountering striking similarity. Troubled by the vague and abundant definitions of “love”,
Tennov coined the term limerence to stand for the feeling state and experience that is typically
referred to as “being in love” (p. 16).
Some defining characteristics of limerence include intrusive and preoccupying thoughts
of the object of desire (limerent object, or L.O.), intense longing for reciprocation, heightened
awareness of the L.O.’s positive qualities ranging from increased empathy to idealization, moods
becoming dependent on the behavior of the L.O., and fear of rejection. Tennov identifies the
goal of reciprocation as integral to the experience of limerence. However, even if reciprocation
is attained through the initiation of a relationship (or by confession of similar feelings) residual
uncertainty may arise. Uncertainty may contribute both to the distress experienced by the
limerent individual, as well as the intensity of the limerence. Although half of the Tennov’s
respondents reported experiencing severe depression in connection to a love affair, 95%
described love as “a beautiful experience” (p. 5). These observations indicate that a certain level
of pain and distress is inherent to the feeling state of being in love.
Tennov (1979) states that while she initially expected to identify certain characteristics or
temperaments that lead people to fall in love more readily than others, throughout the course of
500+ interviews she was surprised to find how “so many people who differed greatly from each
other described such similar subjective states” further stating that this inclined her to generalize
“that the state of being in love could happen to anyone” (Tennov, p. 13, 1979). She then details a
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pivotal discussion in which a colleague describes having never experienced the feeling state of
“being in love” while involved in romantic relationships, although she had regarded these
relationships as loving. This indicates that while there is no ordained prerequisite for falling in
love (and experiencing heartbreak), it is not guaranteed that every individual will experience this.
Although Tennov speaks of differences between her interviewees, she provides virtually
no demographic information for this population. The only demographic information indicated is
that she interviewed both men and women, from a range of ages, many of them connected to the
college where she worked as a professor. She does not report any statistical data and does not
mention race, ethnicity, location, sexual orientation, gender identity, ability, or religious
affiliation.
Modern Symptomatology and Clinical Implications
“When madly in love or desperately heart-broken, many of us manifest unusual
behavior or experience upsetting episodes that are disruptive to our daily routine
and sometimes even present danger” (Altbauer-Rudnik, p. 86, 2012)
We have discussed the general idea that both romantic love and romantic heartbreak have
the potential to incite emotional distress. However, there are certain identifiable symptoms that
arise from romantic heartbreak that may be useful in guiding the theoretical analysis and forming
a modernized view of love-melancholy. Field (2011) identifies symptoms that are shared by
those who are experiencing bereavement and those who are experiencing romantic heartbreak.
Some symptoms of romantic heartbreak include: intrusive thoughts and difficulty controlling
them, sleep disturbances/insomnia, depression, anxiety, exaggerated attempts to re-establish the
relationship, angry and vengeful behavior, and substance use (Field, p. 382, 2011). Tallis (2004)
further cites obsessive thinking and OCD, mania, and suicide as potential areas of concern for
those suffering from lovesickness.
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Importantly, Field (2011) identifies biochemical changes that occur in both bereavement
and romantic heartbreak. One study using fMRI scans found increased blood flow to the
cingulate cortex in women who were grieving the loss of a romantic relationship. Brain activity
involving the cingulate cortex is associated with rejection, sadness, anger, and anxiety (Field, p.
384, 2011).
Field further discusses two significant observations that support the assertion that the
feelings associated with romantic heartbreak are similar to those associated with romantic love.
One study examined fMRI scans of women who were recently rejected by romantic partners (but
still very much in love) alongside women who were happily partnered, and found that the areas
of the brain associated with physical pain lit up for both groups when women were shown photos
of their loved one. Field further reports, “the brain releases similar chemicals for both romantic
breakups and romantic love including pheromones, dopamine, norepinephrine, epinephrine and
serotonin” which attests to the similarity of these feeling states (p. 384). If romantic love and
romantic heartbreak are so closely linked, it follows that even those who are happily partnered
may experience some of the same distressing symptoms as those who are heartbroken. These
aforementioned biopsychosocial factors create a clear indication that love-melancholy is an area
that deserves increased clinical attention due to the severity and breadth of symptoms associated
with it.
So far, we have established foundational elements of love-melancholy as clinical
phenomena:




Clinical conceptualizations of love-melancholy are temporally rooted and socially
constructed, impacting diagnosis and treatment
Both romantic love and heartbreak include feelings of distress and pleasure.
A central theme of love-melancholy is the rejection of the mourning process in
favor of the ongoing erotic fixation, a refusal to accept transience

14

With these foundations in mind, it is useful to move towards a deeper analysis of the process of
mourning and melancholia as they relate to the clinical phenomena of love-melancholy. The
following chapter will generally identify Freud’s psychodynamic contributions to the topic
romantic love and distress, introduce the major concepts of Freud’s (1917) Mourning and
Melancholia, and provide a basis for a theoretical analysis of the phenomena.
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CHAPTER IV
Freud’s Mourning, Melancholia, and pre-Object Relations theories
Freud’s (1917) Mourning and Melancholia is regarded as one of the most important
contributions to the discipline of psychoanalytic theory, and helps to illuminate Freud’s prolific
legacy. Within this text Freud introduces a number of concepts integral to many of his later
theories and formative to the object relations theorists that follow him, especially Melanie Klein
(Bergmann, 2009). Speaking to the significance of this work as a benchmark within the
evolution of Freudian thought, Aslan (2009) identifies this paper as widely regarded by authors
and theorists “as a hinge—an articulation—between the first, ‘topographic’ theory of the mind,
and the second, ‘structural’ theory” (p. 188).
The focus of this chapter is to name and describe the concepts and processes that Freud
hypothesizes as operational within mourning and melancholia, and to identify the initial seeds
that blossom into object relations theory. The larger aim of this task is to later utilize these
theories to frame a discussion of intrapsychic processes and mechanisms that are operational
within love-melancholy and conversely may provide relief from the pain and anguish associated
with it.
A secondary yet imperative task of this chapter is to provide the reader with a contextual
basis for Freud’s ideas. This will be achieved through a review of Freud’s understanding of
romantic love, discussion of the historical and theoretical precursors to the 1915 paper, and a
glance at the subsequent expansions and alterations that followed. While examining a work of
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this magnitude and influence it can be tempting to fall into an ahistorical and oversimplified
analysis of the concepts presented. However, Freud’s own warnings against overgeneralization
as well as the uncertainty and curiosity made evident within his writing style remind us that it is
necessary to view Mourning and Melancholia with a lens of liminality (Dozois, 2000; Quinodoz,
2009).
The work of this chapter involves the demystification of complex theoretical concepts.
That being said, there are some ongoing mysteries that have been left uncovered by myself as
well as by the writings I’ve encountered through review of the relevant literature. For instance,
one element that has proved especially frustrating to me is that Freud does not explicitly identify
the melancholic process outlined in Mourning and Melancholia in relation to distress associated
with romantic love attachments. The words “loss of the love object” seem to appear
unrelentingly in Freud’s (1915) articulation of melancholia, and the identified symptoms of this
affliction clearly evoke the familiar dark pleasure of the phenomena:
“…profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of
the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding
feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and
culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment” (p. 244)
That being said, the majority of modern scholarship focused on Mourning and Melancholia
frames Freud’s melancholia as an early rendering of the cluster of symptoms and experiences we
presently understand as clinical depression (Dozois, 2000; Weiss & Lang, 2000). How do we
account for the fact that Mourning and Melancholia is neither primarily, nor widely, understood
as a paper about the pain of romantic love and heartbreak? Not by Freud during his lifetime, nor
by modern psychodynamic thinkers and writers. Looking first towards Freud’s major
contributions to the realm of romantic love and heartbreak provides the contextual base for a rereading of mourning and melancholia as a paper about love’s pain.
17

Freud’s Three Theories of Love
Bergmann (1988) explains that Freud approached the inquiry of love with hesitation,
fearing that a psychoanalytic perspective on romantic love would prove clumsy when compared
to the contributions of poets. This hesitation is perhaps only evident in that Freud never fully
articulated a complete theory of love, and instead funneled his ideas into three mostly divergent
theories of love each with their own trajectory and implications. The breadth of Freud’s
influence on our modern conceptualization of romantic love is immense, however, based on
evidence garnered from personal correspondences (as well as Freud’s never developing a
cohesive theory of love) Bergmann (1980) asserts that Freud did not believe he could fully
articulate a metapsychology of love comparable to his work on dreams. In a 1907 letter to Jung,
Freud writes, “When I have totally overcome by libido (in the common sense), I shall undertake
to write a love life of mankind” (Bergmann, p. 58, 1980). Although lessons on love are bountiful
in many of his works, a cohesive love life of mankind authored by Freud has never been seen nor
heard of. While considering the application of Freudian theory to the concept of romantic
heartbreak, it is useful to be aware of the aforementioned complexities that Freud may have felt
regarding the topic of romantic love. With this in mind, we will now review the three primary
developments articulated by Freud under the domain of romantic love.
According to Bergmann (1988), Freud’s first major contribution to the phenomena of
romantic love is the genetic theory initially articulated in Three Theories of Sexuality (1905).
During infancy, the mother-child relationship serves as a prototype for all love relationships that
follow and is characterized by the infant’s simultaneous tender and erotic feelings for the parent
(sensory pleasure and need-gratification experienced by the infant through breastfeeding is an oft
cited metaphorical and practical example of this). In latency, the child’s erotic impulses towards
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the parent are repressed while the tender feelings remain. Then, during adolescence, the erotic
and tender feelings rejoin and may be directed towards another (nonincestuous) object. Freud
suggested that the inability to love and/or attain sexual gratification might be a result of the
tender and/or erotic currents failing to join together. A number of theorists furthered these
genetic concepts as a means of differentiating between mature and immature love. Klein, for
example, focused on splitting (dichotomized idealization and devaluation of the object) as a
feature that arrests development at the primitive, oral position and prevents one from reaching
the mature, genital position where the good and bad parts of the object are more fully integrated.
Freud’s second theory of love introduces the self (or ego) as a potentially influential
factor in love object choice, and appears in his 1914 paper On Narcissism. Freud (1914) states
that a person may love “what he himself is, what he himself was, what he himself would like to
be, someone who was once part of himself” (p.90). Strachey (1957) cites this paper as especially
important as it introduces the concept of the self-governing ego ideal that is integral to the
structural theory model. Freud (1914) additionally makes distinctions between libido directed
towards the ego versus libido directed towards the object, thus providing a starting point for
concepts further explored in Mourning and Melancholia (1915) concerning the direction of
cathetic energy. Plainly, this second theory of love introduces the notion that one’s internal
understanding and experience of self is present in both love object choice and relations.
Bergmann (1980) describes Freud’s third theory of love as lacking in clarity and
indicative of Freud’s struggle to identify the manner by which sexual drives may transform into
love. This appears in Instincts and Vicissitudes (1915), which Bergmann (1980) describes as
“one of Freud’s difficult essays” (p.655). Freud (1915) concludes that while love does not derive
from the sexual instinct it does encompass “the expression of the whole current of sexual
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feelings” (Bergmann, p. 655, 1980). Although Freud continued to elaborate on the qualities and
nature of love in relation to these theories, Bergmann (1980) states that there were no entirely
new concepts introduced regarding romantic love following Instincts and Vicissitudes (1915).
Bergmann (1980) concludes his discussion of these three theories by identifying the
important contributions made by Freud that form our modern conceptualization of romantic love,
naming the following processes: “refinding, hoping to find what was denied, idealization, and
integration” (p. 670). Although Freud did not appear to reach a finalized metapsychology of
love, he leaves ample fertile ground for further exploration and discovery. While many of these
concepts, especially those articulated in On Narcissism (1914), are influential to and even
explicitly revisited in Mourning and Melancholia (1915) Freud may have been hesitant to
explicitly discuss intrapsychic mechanisms of romantic heartbreak in the absence of a concrete
and finalized theory of love.
Historical and Theoretical Precursors
While we have discussed Freud’s own theories of love that predate 1915’s Mourning and
Melancholia, there are additional theoretical and historical precursors that are influential to this
work. As with discussion of any theory or ideological premise, it is necessary to conceive of the
theorist as a human being with a certain individual experience that the theory itself cannot
escape. One way to facilitate this understanding is to locate the sociocultural and historical
landscape that the theorist exists within at the time of the theory’s construction. This process
may allow us to better avoid attributing omnipotence to the theorist, which tends to cloak the
theory in an impenetrability that is counter to the aim of critical analysis. Freud’s intersecting
identities of father, son, teacher, Jew, husband, and friend (as well as his early career and training
in medicine) all provide points of entry to significant elements related to the initial development
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of this theory as well as its evolution (Dozois, 2009). Although I will not address each potential
influence individually, as that is the work for a much longer paper, I will highlight those that are
most notable to Freud’s process in constructing this work.
Dozois (2009) states that Freud initially identified a connection between mourning and
melancholia in an unpublished draft written in 1895, arguing that melancholia arose from “grief
over to some (probably libidinal) loss” (p.173). The timeline following this initial observation
becomes a bit murky, as it seems that a number of psychoanalytic thinkers in Freud’s circle were
considering the etiology and symptoms of melancholia as well as beginning to consider relations
between ego and object. In 1911, Freud’s student Karl Abraham conducted a case study of six
patients with severe depression and remarked; “hostility and libidinal ambivalence impaired their
ability to love” (Dozois, p. 171, 2009). This is a close articulation to the concepts more fully
explored by Freud in Mourning and Melancholia, which was written after this finding and
Abraham is credited in a footnote to Freud’s paper to honor the significance of these
observations. Dozois (2009) suggests that while the timeline of these writings is in favor of
Abraham as originator, Abraham eventually identified his 1911 contribution as influenced by
Freud’s earlier articulations of libido, introjection, and object loss. The concept of introjection
was also borrowed and modified from Freud’s student Ferenczi, who first noted this process in
his 1909 paper exploring transference (Dozois, 2009). These pathways are congruent with
Freud’s own observation that the field of psychoanalysis was reliant upon the exploration of
long-held ideas. As Dozois (2009) succinctly points out, Freud never claimed Mourning and
Melancholia (1917) to be an entirely original work.
While considering the intellectual climate that this paper arose from, it is important to
mention that Mourning and Melancholia (1917) is one in a series of twelve papers that Freud
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completed between 1914 and 1915. Ogden (2009) explains that Freud intended to compile these
papers into a book titled Preliminaries to a Metapsychology, however only five of the works
were ever published. Freud destroyed the remaining seven essays, and commented to Ferenczi
that these works deserved “suppression and silence” (Ogden, p.150, 2009). Any further
reasoning for this silencing remains unknown. In addition to the intensity of Freud’s intellectual
and academic life at this time, World War I was a traumatic daily reality for Freud at this time
(Dozois, 2000). Two of Freud’s three sons were fighting on the front lines, and a number of his
friends and colleagues had been recruited. Furthermore, basic resources like food and fuel were
scarce. Although Mourning and Melancholia was completed in 1915, the war halted its’
publication until 1917.
A few months after his completion of Mourning and Melancholia, Freud (1915)
published a paper titled On Transience where he utilizes his theory of mourning to address the
collective, permeating feeling of loss and anguish brought by the destruction of the Great War.
In this text Freud recounts walking in the countryside one year earlier with a young poet friend
who, while noting the beauty of the landscape around them, described being unable to derive any
joy from the scene due to his knowing that it would eventually fade away—decay and die in the
winter. Freud expresses disbelief at such a sentiment, citing many examples in which transient
beauty may still be both experienced and remembered as beauty nonetheless. As the poet
remains unconvinced, Freud observes that the evident resistance towards divesting energy from
things once loved and now lost is embedded within the process of mourning. Freud then locates
us in his present, using stirringly passionate language to describe the war that has not only
eviscerated the countryside he and the poet had looked upon one year earlier, but shook the very
foundation of Germany—robbing its people of what they had once loved and the ideals they held
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in highest regard (Freud, p. 307, 1915). In the face of these immense losses, Freud is able to offer
a beacon of promise for the future wherein walking the painful path of mourning allows room for
new love to enter. The concept of transience will be revisited throughout this paper as a
significant component of mourning and of love itself.
Mourning and Melancholia (1917)
Freud’s (1917) inquiry into the nature of melancholia begins with comparison. He
identifies melancholia as nearly identical to mourning in all regards, save for one important
distinguishing feature. This significant difference then provides the basis for his analysis of
melancholia’s process. Let us consider Freud’s articulation of mourning as a point of origin.
Mourning
Mourning is defined by Freud (1917) as a reaction that occurs following the loss of a
loved person, or in certain cases, the reaction to a significant loss that may be somewhat less
concrete—i.e. the loss of one’s ideals or freedom (p. 243). While painful, mourning is
nonetheless viewed as a normal, non-pathological process. Freud (1917) explains that it is often
thought that any interference with the process of mourning is likely useless and potentially even
harmful to the mourner (p. 244). The features of mourning include: a painful state of mind, loss
of interest in the outside world, inhibition of activity, loss of the ability to adopt a new love, and
rejection of thought that does not involve the lost person. These symptoms indicate a strong
libidinal attachment to the lost love object, as energy is directed towards thoughts and memories
of this person. When mourning is progressing as normal, there is a repeated and painful
reckoning of the loss that has occurred. Freud notes that opposition to the loss is to be expected,
explaining; “people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a
substitute is already beckoning to them” (p. 244). Despite this opposition, reality typically sets
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in. Each time the mourner is met with thoughts and memories of the lost person, she is reminded
that the loss is real and final. Eventually this struggle gives way to a detachment of libidinal
energy from the lost object, and is free to be directed towards another.
Melancholia
As in mourning, melancholia is a state that arises following the loss of a love object.
Freud (1917) suggests that in the case of melancholia, the nature of the loss may somewhat less
conscious than in mourning—“he knows whom he has lost, but not what he has lost in him” (p.
245). In both mourning and melancholia, the loss may be as concrete as an actual death, or as
abstract as the loss of an ideal. The distinguishing difference between these two states is an
extreme diminishment in self-regard that is present in melancholia, yet not in mourning. This
low self-regard can result in sadistic impulses of self-punishment and, in extreme cases, suicide.
Freud (1917) states that this negative sense of self reflects an “impoverishment of the ego on
grand scale” (p. 246). This raises the question of how object loss transforms into what we can
understand as a kind of ego loss. Freud (1917) comes to a suggestion of how this transformation
occurs by observing the nature of the melancholic’s self-criticism. While considering the
melancholic’s specific complaints it is often evident that these accusations are more accurately
attributed to the lost love object, yet they are somehow misdirected towards the self. He states;
“so we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches
against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient’s own ego” (Freud,
p. 248, 1917). Now we will examine the processes by which this occurs.
Identification and Introjection
According to Aslan (2009), Freud uses the terms identification and introjection
interchangeably to describe the process by which object loss transitions into an impoverishment
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of ego. However, later theories (both articulated by Freud, as well as object relations theorists
that followed) have expanded our understanding of these terms by naming subtle yet important
differences between them. Aslan (2009) describes introjection as the process by which “an
external object and all its relations with the ego (the self) are internalized into the psyche,
keeping their identity and characteristics as object, as subjectively perceived” (p. 164). Plainly,
this describes the internal sense that we have of ourselves, of others, and of ourselves in relation
to others. Identification is somewhat more complex. Aslan (2009) states that identification is a
process by which the ego takes on some or all of the characteristics of the external or internal
object. In identification, it seems that these characteristics come to be understood as intrinsic to
the ego.
The Melancholic’s Narcissistic Identification
Freud (1917) identifies some necessary precursors to the identification that occurs within
melancholia. He explains that the libidinal attachment to the lost love object must be quite
strong and that it must also contain a certain level of ambivalence, usually due to some
disappointment or pain associated with the object prior to the loss. As stated earlier, the
characteristic of self-reproach evident in melancholia arises from anger towards the lost love
object that is directed towards the self. In mourning, libidinal energies are slowly divested from
the lost object and are eventually free to be directed towards a new object. However, in
melancholia, the object is instead consumed by the ego in a narcissistic identification—“and thus
the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special
agency, as if it were an object, the forsaken object” (Freud, p. 249, 1917). Negative impulses
can then be directed towards the ego (wherein the object is consumed) while love towards the
lost object may be preserved, thus in some way preserving the love-relation in spite of the loss.
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This struggle both reinforces, and is reinforced by, unconscious and ongoing ambivalence
towards the lost love object. The melancholic is unable to face the loss, and instead of engaging
in the painful disconnection that is a requirement of normal mourning, retains the narcissistic
identification as an attempt to protect the love relation from extinction at a cost to the ego
(Ogden, 2009).
Seeking a Resolution
While Freud (1917) compellingly demystifies the complex and nuanced processes of both
mourning and melancholia, he stumbles in identifying the steps necessary for a resolution of
melancholia. There is a brief discussion of mania resulting from the direction of libidinal
energy, yet this is left mostly unresolved. Freud does suggest that the struggle of ambivalence
may be integral to the resolution of melancholia (just as the continual recognition of death is
integral resolution of mourning), yet we are left without a clear conclusion on this matter.
Now that the theory has been prefaced with the relevant Freudian theories of love,
historically situated, and its concepts and processes fully outlined and described it is useful to
move to a discussion of the object relations theories that resulted from this foundational work.
I’ve chosen to focus on Melanie Klein’s contributions to object relations theory, with specific
attention to the concepts of ambivalence, splitting, and progression from the paranoid-schizoid
position to the depressive position.
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CHAPTER V
Melanie Klein’s Object Relations
The general focus of all object relations theory is the self’s relation to others, specifically
how internal representations of external objects contribute to intrapsychic structure and ego
functioning. In an overview of object relations theory, Melano Flanagan (2011) quotes object
relations theorist Melanie Klein to stress the general applicability of this concept; “there is no
instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, external
or internal; in other words, object relations are at the center of emotional life” (p. 118). Object
relations theory is well suited for an analysis of how the loss of a love object may impact
intrapsychic functioning.
Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917) is regarded as the first articulation of how
internalization of an object can influence the nature of one’s psychic structure (Melano Flanagan,
2011). This assertion set the stage for a theory of object relations, composed of several separate
and sometimes divergent theoretical schools of thought. The commonality that joins these
separate schools is the shared focus on the significance of relationships to ego formation.
Mitchell & Black (1995) identify Klein as the foremost contributor to contemporary
psychoanalytic thought following Freud, due to her observations of early childhood anxieties that
led to the formulation of the developmental paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. This
chapter will outline Klein’s major theoretical contributions with specific focus on the paranoidschizoid and depressive positions, detailing their characteristic anxieties, processes, and
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purposes. In the interest of regarding the theorist as a product of a specific time and place, we
will begin with the historical context for Klein’s life and work while briefly addressing
controversies regarding her clinical techniques.
Notes on Klein’s Life and Work
Melanie Klein was born in Vienna to Jewish parents, and experienced significant losses
and grief through her young life. Klein entered young adulthood plagued by depression. Klein
always had intellectual aspirations, and lacked satisfaction in her life as mother and wife. In
1914, Klein discovered Freud’s work on dreams and this sparked her intense fascination with
psychoanalysis. This same year she entered into psychoanalysis, with Ferenczi, a disciple of
Freud and began her own academic inquiry into the field through analysis and observation of her
own children. Klein’s work began to garner significant attention, and in 1926 she was invited to
move to England by Freud translator Ernest Jones and this is where she would continue to work
until her death (Mitchell & Black, 1995).
Throughout her career in psychoanalysis, Klein consistently identified that the goal of her
work was to confirm and elaborate upon Freud’s theories through observation and clinical work
with children (Mitchell & Black, 1995). In the late 1920’s, a significant rift was evident between
followers of Klein and followers of Anna Freud, daughter of Sigmund, due to significant
disagreements between the two theorists regarding the psychoanalysis of children. Anna Freud
suggested that the egos of children were too fragile to participate effectively in psychoanalysis,
while Klein suggested that children were equally as analyzable as adults so long as appropriate
technique was employed. Klein engaged in analysis of children’s play in a similar manner to the
way that Freud analyzed the dreams of adults. Within a series of discussions that took place at
the British Psychoanalytic Society, clear and marked differences between the Kleinians and
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Anna Freudians were identified and this solidified the rift into a clear and permanent (existing to
this day) separation between the two theoretical camps. Critics of Kleinian technique and theory,
even today, tend to problematize the overwhelmingly interpretive nature of Klein’s work,
especially regarding her observations of the psyche of preverbal infants and young children
(Mitchell & Black, 1995). Even though Klein’s methods are viewed as controversial and
questionable, her contributions to the field of psychoanalysis and elaboration of Freud’s theories
are nonetheless regarded as significant.
External Objects / Internal Objects
Melano Flanagan (2011) cites consumption as integral to object relations theories,
comparing the psychic incorporation of ones’ external experiences of and relationship to others
to the body’s process of taking in food to be metabolized. Just as individual bodies metabolize
nutrients differently, there are varied ways in which individual psyches may incorporate certain
characteristics or elements of the object (p. 121). This metaphor invokes the concepts of
introjection and identification that Freud (1917) had begun to explore within Mourning and
Melancholia, and then became centrally operational in Klein’s understanding of the psyche.
Klein, alongside contemporaries such as Radó (1928), often utilized the metaphor of the
infant suckling at her mother’s breast as the earliest example of incorporation of external object
relations into the inner psychic structure of the infant. The infant receives gratification, comfort,
pleasure, and fulfillment when she takes in milk from her mother’s breast. Through this positive
interaction, she experiences the actual live mother (or the external object) as a force of good
while simultaneously engaged in an internalized experience of feeling goodness, fulfillment, and
love. This internalization contributes to the formation of an internal object, or phantasized
imago, of mother as “good object”. The external mother is felt (internally) by the infant to hold
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these gratifying characteristics, and the benevolent external object matches up with the internal
object representation. The infant’s view of self (ego) is shaped by introjection in that the infant is
able to view herself as worthy of love, gratification, and fulfillment via the object relation.
Through the process of projection, the infant’s established internal object influences her
perception and experience of the external object over time. Klein (1946) explains the cyclical
and incorporative nature of this process; “thus from the beginning object-relations are moulded
by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external objects and
situations.” (p. 2) Importantly this process is established at a time marked by omnipotence, prior
to the infant’s capacity for reality testing, rendering external and internal objects
indistinguishable (Mitchell & Black, 1995).
In Klein’s view, internal object representations are shaped by unconscious or phantastical
desires / anxieties alongside interactions with external objects occurring in the real world.
Mitchell and Black (1995) explain the Freudian view that the object is discovered by the subject
as a means to satisfy or frustrate existing libidinal impulses. Klein departs from this and suggests
that libidinal desires and frustrations are innately connected, at their origin, to external objects
and internal object representations; “the object of desire was implicit in the experience of desire
itself” (Mitchell & Black, p.91, 1995). While Freud’s focus is the libidinal drives, Klein’s
emphasis is the object relationship. Klein’s most important contribution, for the purposes of this
inquiry regarding romantic heartbreak, is her identification of two distinct developmental
positions in which the infant moves from experiencing part-object relations in the paranoidschizoid position to experiencing whole-object relations in the depressive position (Klein, 1935;
Klein, 1946). Use of the term position (as opposed to stage) is intentional, as it speaks to the
idea that one can regress to or repeat these processes over the lifetime.
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The Paranoid-Schizoid Position
Importantly, just as the infant experiences fulfillment by the “good” external object
(establishing the “good” internal object) through the need-gratification offered by the mothers’
breast, the infant also experiences significant anxiety and frustration when the mother’s breast is
not available to her. When the external object is not providing satisfaction it is perceived as the
“bad” object, and thus internally represented as bad as well. Klein (1935) posits that the infant
projects an aggressive impulse onto these “bad” internalized objects, which leads to the infant’s
understanding of these internal objects as dangerous persecutors attacking her from within. The
infant’s aggression towards the denying breast forms an object relationship marked by sadistic
impulses and persecutory anxieties (Klein, p. 262, 1935). Klein (1946) identifies this state of
persecutory anxiety as the hallmark of an early, primitive developmental position in the life of
the infant—the paranoid-schizoid position. The term “paranoid-schizoid” was coined by Klein
to speak to the nature of the persecutory anxieties (paranoia) as well as the anxiety of being
destroyed from within, the same threat of disintegration / falling to pieces that is commonly seen
as the primary anxiety operational in schizophrenia.
Occurring within the first few months of the infants’ life, the paranoid-schizoid position
is defined by the defensive process of splitting external/internal “good” objects and
external/internal “bad” objects. At this time the infant is unable to conceive of the breast (or the
object) as a singular force that provides both gratification and denial. The splitting provides a
defensive function for the infant in that she is able to protect the internal “good” objects, and
herself, from the destructive and persecutory “bad” objects through the separation. As her
aggressive desires and frustrations are directed towards the “bad” object, devaluation and hatred
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of the “bad” object (both internal and external) increase. On the other side of this, idealization of
the “good” object is ramped up through the process of projection and introjection maintaining
this object as endlessly benevolent and deserving of fierce protection and possession. This
process of idealization/devaluation leads to a fear of the loved “good” object being lost or
destroyed and an impulse to contain it within the ego. In normal progression, the process of
splitting gives way to an ambivalent reconciliation in which one enters the depressive position.
The Depressive Position
With each instance of introjection and projection that occurs within the paranoid-schizoid
position, the infant is confronted with the reality that the good object and bad object are one in
the same and thus moves towards a more whole object relation (Klein, 1935). This process is
identified with sharp clarity in the conclusion to A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of ManicDepressive States:
“…at this stage of development the unification of external and internal, loved and
hated, real and imaginary objects is carried out in such a way that each step in the
unification leads again to a renewed splitting of the imagos. But as the adaptation
to the external world increases, this splitting is carried out on planes which
gradually become increasingly nearer and nearer to reality. This goes on until love
for the real and the internalized objects and trust in them are well established.
Then ambivalence, which is partly a safeguard against one’s own hate and against
the hated and terrifying objects, will in normal development again diminish in
varying degrees.” (Klein, p.288, 1935)
The infant is able to begin to recognize the once separate “good” and “bad” breast as the
actually whole mother, with whom she has a dynamic relationship. The ego begins to more fully
identify with both internal/external objects, and defenses of expulsion and destruction become
less valuable due to the realization that this would lead to the destruction of both “good” and
“bad” internal objects.
The whole object relation is accompanied by the reckoning that there is potential for the
loved object to be lost, signifying the infant’s arrival to the depressive position. According to
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Klein, the depressive position is characterized by mourning; “not until the object has been loved
as a whole can its loss be felt as a whole.” (p. 264).
The primary anxiety within the depressive position is that, due to real or imagined
threats; the love object will be lost or destroyed (Klein, 1935). This threat applies to both the
external love object as well as the internal object representation. Klein states that this anxiety is
accompanied by recognition of the sadistic impulses towards the now whole object that was once
regarded in part as “bad”, resulting in feelings of guilt and a desire for reparation. Importantly,
Klein states that the simultaneous feeling of guilt and desire for reparation forms the foundation
for love.
Klein on Love and Mourning
We have discussed the ambivalent struggle of love and hate that erupts in the psyche of
the infant, resulting in dread that the love object may be lost as a result of aggressive impulses
towards the object or any number of disastrous external threats. This anxiety brings forth
feelings of guilt derived from recognition of hateful impulses directed towards the object. This
guilt is then met with a desire for reparation, to “make good the injuries we did in phantasy”
(Klein, p.313, 1937). In many cases, this motivation for reparation leads to the positive and
nurturing caretaking characteristics within a love relationship. However, in early development
(and periods of regression later in life) the new well-intentioned desire for reparation may be
thwarted by a prevailing manic omnipotence arising from the young child’s inability to trust that
her own aggressive impulses can be kept at bay (Klein, 1940). When reparation fails, desire to
obtain control and triumph over the object causes paranoid persecutory anxieties to re-emerge,
and a move towards the depressive position is once again necessary. Klein (1940) identifies this
as the manic position.

33

We’ve discussed the feelings of mourning, guilt, and reparation that arise
throughout the progression of the depressive position, as one realizes that the love object may be
lost or destroyed. In her most direct response to Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917),
Klein (1940) discusses her interpretation of the mechanisms at work within the process of actual
mourning. When an external love object is in fact lost through death or by another form of
separation, an increased anxiety arises regarding the stability of the internal object
representation. The mourner retreats to earlier anxieties of persecution and annihilation,
contributing to internal chaos and lack of trust in the stability of all internal object
representations. If the external love object has been destroyed, the primary depressive anxiety
realized, then all internal objects are potentially compromised. Eventually, as in the depressive
position, each ambivalent interaction leads the mourner to accept that the internal object relations
persist even while the external object is lost. If the mourner is able to establish the lost love
object within her ego, she is able to regain trust and security in the internal objects and attain
some security in the world and hope for the future.
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CHAPTER VI
Discussion
In the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), Lacuna Inc. offers a memory
erasure procedure to provide a permanent relief from the pain that arises following the loss of a
love object. The Lacuna technician enters the subject’s subconscious through a brain mapping
process and erases all memories of the lost loved one. The subject is left entirely unaware that
the relationship had occurred at all. The erasure procedure does not allow for the preservation of
good memories, which must be destroyed alongside the bad in order for it to be effective. This
means that while the distressed subject may choose to surpass the mourning process following
the loss of the external object relationship, this comes at a cost of losing the whole internal object
representation as well.
In reality, a selective memory erasure procedure is not available nor is it scientifically
feasible at this time. However, if the procedure were to be available one may imagine that a
sufferer of love-melancholy may elect to undergo this to cope with her distress. The desire to
erase a lost loved one from memory evokes Wells’ (2007) assertion that love-melancholy
manifests as a resistance to mourning the lost object. Wells’ (2007) observation arises from
Freud’s (1915) work on transience, in which he states that the resistance to enjoying what is
beautiful yet impermanent may be understood as a “revolt [in their minds] against mourning.”
(p.306)
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In the world of the film, the viewer follows protagonist Joel on a dreamlike journey
through his subconscious as he undergoes the erasure of all memories of his former lover
Clementine. Joel’s initial decision to erase Clementine can be viewed as a resistance of the
mourning process. However, while the procedure is underway Joel rebels against the erasure and
scrambles to hold on to both the good and bad memories of Clementine. These encounters may
be viewed as analogous to the process described by Klein (1935), wherein the subject moves
from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position and a more whole object
relationship through each struggle of ambivalence. In revisiting these memories Joel experiences
pain, desperation, longing, and regret alongside joy, fulfillment, and desire ultimately arriving to
a more whole internal object representation of Clementine. This journey through memory leads
to Joel’s eventual acceptance of the transience of romantic love.
This film serves as the landscape for deeper exploration of how the theoretical concepts
outlined in the previous chapters are operational within love-melancholy. As discussed in the
methodology chapter, the film functions as a case study in that a psychodynamic analysis is
readily accessible through the film’s exploration of Joel’s subconscious world. This chapter will
outline Joel’s move from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position, his eventual
mourning of the end of the relationship with Clementine, and the resulting hope for future
attachments displayed in the film’s final scene.
Joel and Clementine’s Object Relations
As Joel undergoes the erasure procedure, he is confronted with the impending loss of his
internal object representations of Clementine with each memory and fantasy he travels through.
As viewers we experience Clementine both as an internal object representation existing in Joel’s
subconscious, and as a real external object existing in the present reality of the film, with the
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lines between these co-existing realities often blurred. Joel’s memories include both actual
events as well as dreamlike fantasies based on his internal object representations of Clementine.
Memories and fantasies, marked by the processes of introjection and projection, are integral to
the formation of all object relations (Klein, 1935).
Another important object relations concept that is referenced throughout the film is the
idea of part-objects vs. whole-objects. Both in present-day scenes, and in the scenes that occur
within Joel’s subconscious, Clementine cautions Joel against viewing her as a part object. On
two occasions within the film she delivers this line:
Clementine: Too many guys think I’m a concept or I complete them or I’m gonna make
them alive. I’m just a fucked up girl who’s looking for my own peace of mind, don’t assign
me yours.

This speaks to the themes of idealization/devaluation, highlighted through splitting, that
are present throughout the film. While Clementine expresses frustration with being viewed as a
part object by Joel, her decision to erase him from memory points to a fragmented internal object
representation of him and of their relationship.
A Revolt Against Mourning
Clementine revolts against mourning, turning towards Lacuna’s erasure procedure as an
attempt to immediately and permanently escape the pain of her heartbreak. She impulsively
enacts her aggressive impulses towards Joel, choosing to destroy both the good object
representation alongside the bad through the erasure. Blue Clementine1 may be viewed as a

1

Clementine’s changing hair color is a cinematic element that helps to distinguish the various external/internal object

representations of this character that we meet throughout the film. Following her erasure procedure, Clementine’s hair is blue.
Here I use the signifier “blue Clementine” to refer to the external object Clementine who exists in present time in the world of the
film.
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melancholic subject experiencing manic decathexis and regression to the paranoid-schizoid
position.
We see Joel experience rejection, anger, and jealousy when he visits (blue) Clementine at
work with the intentions of winning her back after an argument. He brings her a Valentine’s gift,
yet she treats him as a complete stranger and has formed a new romantic relationship that Joel
bears witness to. Joel, heartbroken, discusses this with a friend who informs him that
Clementine decided to have him erased from memory with the help of Lacuna Inc. In
desperation, loneliness, and pain—Joel decides that he wants to have her erased as well.
At this time, Joel (like Clementine) can be understood as a melancholic subject regressed
to the paranoid-schizoid position. This is evidenced in the splitting seen early on in the erasure
process. At first, Clementine is solely represented in Joel’s subconscious memories as bad
object. We see the cruel words exchanged in their breakup, boredom and resentment at a dinner,
struggles in communication and hurt feelings. Bad object Clementine is drunk, insecure,
impulsive, nagging, and cruel. Paranoid-schizoid annihilation anxieties are marked visually in
Joel’s fantastical subconscious world. Joel chases after Clementine as she barges out of the
apartment. He desperately urges her to get in the car with him, she screams at him to get away; a
car comes falling from the sky…
Joel: Look at it out here! It’s all falling apart! I’m erasing you and I’m happy! You did it to
me first! I can’t believe you did this to me.

In this one statement the defining characteristics of Klein’s (1935) paranoid-schizoid
position are evident: persecutory anxiety, fear of disintegration, paranoia, and splitting.
Importantly, Joel’s fixation on the bad object relation at this time in the erasure speaks to the
defensive function of splitting. The splitting allows him to temporarily preserve the good
internal object Clementine, but not for long.
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As both Joel’s external object relationship and internal object representations of
Clementine are being erased, we see the parallel process of blue Clementine entering into a
distressed scramble to find her way back to what has been lost to her—the melancholic “object
loss withdrawn from consciousness” (Freud, 1915, p. 245). In this moment of panic, paranoidschizoid anxieties of annihilation and disintegration are activated:
Clementine: I don’t know! I don’t know! I’m lost, I’m scared, I feel like I’m disappearing! My
skin’s coming off. I’m getting old! Nothing makes any sense to me! Nothing makes any sense…
nothing makes any sense

She is fixated in cyclical mania / melancholia, presenting with increasingly paranoid
affect and unable to access security and trust in the stability of the world around her and in her
internal objects.
Joel Enters the Depressive Position
As stated previously, Joel’s subconscious journey initially brings him through memories
and fantasies in which Clementine is solely represented as bad object. As his journey progresses,
the memories contain more positive and neutral representations of Clementine which suggests a
move towards increased ambivalence. Joel’s internal object representations of Clementine have
become less split, signifying Joel’s shift from a part object relation to a more whole object
relation. Klein (1935) asserts that the move from part object to whole object relations is a
defining component of the depressive position.
I suggest that Joel’s entrance into the depressive position is indicated by the visit to his
memory of comforting Clementine during a moment of vulnerability. They are lying in bed
under a brightly colored quilt, the lighting is soft and warm, and they face each other as Joel
gently holds Clementine’s cheek. She is tearful as she tells him about a painful memory from
childhood and asks whether she is pretty. Joel witnesses himself kissing Clementine as he
urgently and compassionately assures her that she is pretty, to which she replies, “Joel, don’t
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ever leave me.” The scene then abruptly changes with harsh and shadowed lighting. Joel is now
alone, desperately grasping onto the sheets, scrambling forward as he pleads, “Please let me keep
this memory, just this one.” This invokes Klein’s (1935) assertion that once the object has been
loved as a whole, its loss may be felt as a whole.
At this point in the film, Joel has been thrown into the hallmark anxiety of the depressive
position; fear of the impending loss of the loved object. He frantically protests against the
erasure, signifying the realization that his aggressive impulses against bad part-object
Clementine may result in losing her entirely:
Joel: I want to call it off… I’ll give you a sign. I want to call it off!
Can you hear me? I don’t want this any more, I want to call it off!

While Joel is desperate to avoid losing Clementine entirely, each memory he travels
through seems to contribute to his development of the more whole internal object Clementine
within his subconscious. While he moves towards increased ambivalence towards Clementine,
he is simultaneously confronted with the reality of the impending loss as she continually
disappears from these memories.
Once Joel enters the depressive position, he is met by a fantastical red Clementine2 on the
frozen Charles River. For the first time within this subconscious journey, they share a mutually
understood reality of what is occurring and begin to run from the Lacuna “eraser guys” together.
Fantastical red Clementine now bands together with Joel as his collaborator and guide in the
mourning process by suggesting that they retreat to Joel’s earlier memories, where she did not
previously exist, in order to go off the map of memories designated by Lacuna to be erased. As
they visit these earlier memories / fantasies, Joel encounters internal object representations of his
earlier attachment figures. Within these scenarios, red Clementine is alongside Joel embodying
2

I’ve coined this fantastical collaborator red Clementine, simply because her hair is now bright red.
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various supportive roles within these memory/fantasies—i.e. a child version of Clementine
comes to defend a child version of Joel when he is bullied. This is significant, due to Klein’s
(1940) assertion that once the real or imagined loss of a love object occurs within mourning, the
stability of all existing internal objects are felt by the subject to be compromised. Understanding
red Clementine as an internal object representation that is part of Joel’s psyche, I view her
inserted role in these memories as a device for Joel to regain security in his earlier internal
objects while simultaneously increasing trust in his internal object representation of her.
Mourning and Transience
Red Clementine, as a device of Joel’s psyche, continues to guide Joel in embracing the
mourning process as they travel through the last of his memories of her. In one scene, they share
a bittersweet reflection of the beginning of their relationship and Joel is again confronted with
the pain of losing her. He imagines whether there is a way to preserve the external object
relationship, as the final loss of his internal object representation of her is looming:
Joel: It would be different, if we could just give it another go around.
Clementine: Remember me. Try your best. Maybe we can.

She disappears, and Joel is left alone again. I read this moment as Clementine’s urging
Joel to remember her as a whole object, holding the good and the bad simultaneously. This
highlights the central task of mourning, to be able to hold on to the whole internal object
relationship while accepting that the external object relationship has ended. While Joel is not
absolved of the sadness of his loss of Clementine, he is beginning to accept its inevitability.
Coming full circle, we are eventually able to witness Joel’s position within the mourning
process marked by his acknowledgment and acceptance of transience:
Clementine: This is it Joel. It’s gonna be gone soon.
Joel: I know.
Clementine: What do we do?
Joel: Enjoy it.
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While the introjected red Clementine initially served to guide him through the mourning
process, this moment illustrates that Joel himself has fully departed from his former resistance to
mourning. He is no longer running from the impending end of the external object relationship,
demonstrating the increased security in his internal object representation of Clementine.
Guilt and Reparation
Klein (1937) explains that feelings of guilt and a desire for reparation are activated
through the process of mourning, and contribute to one’s capacity for love. Guilt arises as a
result of the subject’s recognition of the aggressive impulses he had towards the bad part object,
now realizing that the good and bad object are one whole. The last fantasy/memory that Joel
experiences during the erasure procedure highlights his guilt, as well as the desire for reparation.
They are on the beach in Montauk, having just met for the first time, exploring an abandoned
house that is collapsing and filling with sand. Together they recall how Joel, afraid of
Clementine’s bravado and perhaps the intensity of their connection, decided to leave the
abandoned house and ran out without saying goodbye. Joel expresses his regret about this
moment, stating, “I wish I stayed. I wish I’d done a lot of things. I wish I’d stayed.”
Clementine, again as an internal object functioning as a component of Joel’s psyche, requests an
alternate goodbye. This can be understood as a manifestation of an arising desire for reparation:
Clementine: What if you stayed this time?
Joel: I walked out the door, there’s no memory left
Clementine: Come back and make up a goodbye at least. Let’s pretend we had one. (they
approach one another, she smiles) Bye, Joel.
Joel: I love you
Clementine: (whispers) Meet me in Montauk.

At this moment, we see that Joel’s internal object representation of Clementine is solid
enough that he is able to express his love for her while simultaneously bearing the pain of losing
her. The significance of their attachment remains, living on in the internalized whole object
relation, alongside a full recognition that the external object relationship has ended.
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Hope for the Future
Joel and Clementine do in fact find their way back to one another, and meet in Montauk
following the erasure procedure, both unsure of what has brought them there. They meet again
and begin to form a new connection, unaware of their shared history together. Their mutual
return to Montauk, the site of their initial meeting two years prior, serves as a reminder that
internal object relations exist within the psyche beyond conscious memory. Although memories
of their former relationship have been erased, the internal object relationship has not fully
disappeared.
In the final scene of the film, Joel and Clementine are made aware of their former
relationship when they each receive audiotape records from a disgruntled Lacuna employee.
Completely unaware of any previous relationship, they are now met with the sound of their own
voices confessing all of the things they hated about one another. Listening to these tapes, they are
thrown headfirst into an ambivalent position as they are confronted with the pain of their former
mutual heartbreak alongside the blossoming admiration they hold for one another. Clementine,
overwhelmed and confused by the hurtful content of the audiotapes, begins to leave. Joel
follows and asks her to stay, suggesting that they bear the complexity of this ambivalence
together:
Joel: I can't see anything I don't like about you
Clementine: But you will, you will think of things and I'll get bored with you and feel trapped
because that's what happens with me
Joel: Okay
Clementine: …Okay

With full acknowledgement of the pain they once caused each other, Joel convinces
Clementine to join him in embracing the potential of their new attachment. We can understand
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Joel as having done the work of mourning the loss of his former love relationship with
Clementine. He is able to carry the internal object relationship with a lens of ambivalence, and
simultaneously accept that the external object relationship he once knew no longer exists. In
considering the significance of Joel’s mourning process, I recall Freud’s (1915) reflection on
transience and his hopeful command; “We shall build up again all that war has destroyed, and
perhaps on firmer ground and more lastingly than before.” (p. 307) Through mourning the actual
or potential loss of a love object, in all of its wholeness, one may rebuild what has been
destroyed while simultaneously creating an even stronger foundation for the future.
Areas for Further Clinical Attention
In my analysis of the clinical phenomena of love-melancholy through the theories of
Freud and Klein and subsequent application to the film, I’ve come to understand that it is
necessary for the clinician to explore the distressed patient’s resistance to mourning the loss of
the love object. By utilizing an object relations theoretical framework, the clinician may identify
a regression to the paranoid-schizoid position marked by increased annihilation anxiety, splitting,
idealization/devaluation, and part object relating. While these defenses might be viewed as
contributory to the patient’s experience of distress, it is important to remember that regression to
the paranoid-schizoid position holds specific meaning for the love-melancholic patient as each
moment of splitting brings the internal/external and good/bad objects closer together resulting in
a more whole and ambivalent object relation. If these regressions are viewed as essential to the
process of mourning itself, and are in service of the development of the whole object relation,
they can be conceived of by the clinician (and patient) as moments bearing opportunity for
growth rather than setbacks.
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There are numerous formal and informal clinical interventions across different modalities
that may be accessed to help guide the patient towards the depressive position through
development of a more whole object representation. Regardless of which intervention the
clinician chooses to utilize, the aim is to assist the patient in viewing the love object with
increased ambivalence and thus more firmly establishing the internal object representation.
As anxiety regarding the actual or imagined loss of the love object arises within the
course of the depressive position, the clinician may consider the relative stability of the patient’s
earlier internal objects and tailor interventions that encourage the reinstatement of these earlier
attachment figures within the patient’s ego. Furthermore, at this time the clinician may identify
and assist the patient in exploring both the guilt arising from her realization of aggressive
impulses towards the object as well as her fantasies of reparation.
Conclusion
I have come to the conclusion that a resolution of the distress of love-melancholy is only
achievable through mourning the actual or possible loss of the love object. The task of mourning
is for the patient to fully incorporate the whole object relation internally, while simultaneously
accepting the end (or the inevitable transience) of the external object relationship. If the patient
is able to achieve this, she may move through the distress of love melancholy with an increased
sense of security in her self and in her earlier attachments, as well as increased hope for the
future. Just as in bereavement work, we as clinicians may tailor our conceptualization and
interventions to support the love melancholic patient through the mourning process. While
mourning the loss of the love object may be a challenging and sorrowful road, it has the potential
to be powerfully transformative.
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